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2027 
SONOGRAMS AND SPEECH: INFORMED CONSENT, 
PROFESSIONAL SPEECH, AND PHYSICIANS’ FIRST 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
Oliana Luke* 
Abstract: Abortion is an extremely divisive topic that has caused waves of litigation. The 
right to access abortion has traditionally been challenged based on due process, equal 
protection, and privacy grounds. However, in a more recent string of cases, physicians have 
been challenging laws that require the physician to narrate an ultrasound before an abortion as 
an abridgment of their First Amendment rights. These cases require courts to balance the 
government’s ability to reasonably regulate a physician through professional licensing with the 
physician’s First Amendment protections against government-compelled speech. This 
Comment argues that, to balance these ideals and survive First Amendment scrutiny, 
mandatory ultrasound laws must include exceptions for therapeutic privilege and patient 
waiver. These exceptions, grounded in the established medical practice of informed consent, 
apply when certain information would be more harmful than beneficial to a patient. Statutes 
that do not include these exceptions accordingly do not comport with First Amendment 
protections against compelled speech. 
INTRODUCTION 
As of August 2020, ten states mandate that a pregnant person seeking 
an abortion receive an ultrasound before the abortion procedure.1 During 
this ultrasound, the pregnant person receiving the abortion typically lies 
half-naked on the examination table while the doctor narrates the 
sonogram.2 The doctor is mandated to describe the different body parts of 
the fetus, the likely age of the fetus, and play audio of the fetal heart tone.3 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2021. I would like to thank 
Professor Robert Gomulkiewicz for his insight, feedback, and support throughout the drafting 
process. I would also like to thank Ian Walsh, Monica Romero, and Quynh La for their relentless 
work on this piece; additionally, many thanks to the entire editorial staff of Washington Law Review 
for their constant dedication to this journal. Finally, eternal gratitude to my literal and chosen family 
for getting me to where I am—I truly could not have done it without all of you. 
1. Requirements  for  Ultrasound,  GUTTMACHER  INST.  (Aug.  1,  2020), http://www.guttmacher. 
org/state-policy/explore/requirements-ultrasound [https://perma.cc/F34F-UYHA]. 
2. See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 255 (4th Cir. 2014). 
3. See Anna Silman, What It’s Like to Endure a Forced Ultrasound Before Your Abortion, THE 
CUT (Dec. 13, 2019), http://www.thecut.com/2019/12/forced-ultrasound-abortion-what-its-like.html 
[https://perma.cc/S4TM-M934]; Jessica Glenza, Abortion: Justices Permit Kentucky Law that 
Requires Doctors to Show Pregnant Women Ultrasounds, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2019), 
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/dec/09/supreme-court-kentucky-abortion-law-doctors-
ultrasound [https://perma.cc/6GFP-8XVN].  
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This mandate usually remains in place even if the patient has received 
multiple ultrasounds that same day, is getting an abortion as the result of 
a rape, or is receiving an abortion for a wanted pregnancy but one with a 
fetal anomaly.4 These laws typically permit the patient to close their eyes 
and shut their ears during the ultrasound and narration.5 Regardless of how 
the patient reacts, the physician must continue under the threat of financial 
penalty or loss of license6—even if the patient is demanding that 
they stop.7 
Abortion is a heavily litigated area—mandatory ultrasound laws are no 
exception.8 The right to receive an abortion is protected under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 Most abortion regulations 
are currently litigated based on the Due Process Clause and the 
corresponding “undue burden” standard, which was established in the 
seminal case Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey.10 However, a unique claim has arisen out of ultrasound informed 
consent laws—one that is based on the infringement of the First 
Amendment rights of the physician performing the abortion rather than on 
the infringement of a patient’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.11 
 
4. See Glenza, supra note 3; Stuart, 774 F.3d at 255. 
5. See EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 424 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. 
denied sub nom. EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Meier, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 655 (2019); 
Stuart, 774 F.3d at 242; Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 
573 (5th Cir. 2012). 
6. See Danielle C. Le Jeune, An “Exception”-Ally Difficult Situation: Do the Exceptions, or Lack 
Thereof, to the “Speech-and-Display Requirements” for Abortion Invalidate Their Use as Informed 
Consent?, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 521, 542 (2014) (“Unless a patient meets one of the few exceptions 
provided to these requirements, the physician must comply with the procedure or face a large fine, 
mandatory disciplinary action, potential criminal penalties, or denial of licensure.”); Deborah Yetter, 
Federal Appeals Court Upholds Kentucky ‘Ultrasound’ Abortion Law, COURIER J. (Apr. 4, 2019), 
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics/ky-legislature/2019/04/04/federal-appeals-
court-upholds-kentucky-ultrasound-abortion-law/3368859002/  [https://perma.cc/K3S6-S2NA] 
(“The law permits a woman to look away from the image and cover her ears to avoid hearing the 
physician’s description or the fetal heartbeat. But physicians who fail to attempt to show and describe 
the fetus to the patient could face fines of up to $250,000 and action against their medical license.”). 
7. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 255 (noting how the law is “[f]orcing this experience on a patient over 
her objections”). 
8. See, e.g., id. at 242 (challenging a North Carolina statute mandating “display[ing] and 
describ[ing] the image during the ultrasound”); EMW, 920 F.3d at 423–24 (challenging Kentucky’s 
Ultrasound Informed Consent Act); Lakey, 667 F.3d at 570, 572–73 (challenging a Texas statute that 
required physicians “to perform and display a sonogram of the fetus” among other requirements to 
gain “informed consent to an abortion”). 
9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
846 (1992). 
10. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
11. E.g., Stuart, 774 F.3d at 244; EMW, 920 F.3d at 423; Lakey, 667 F.3d at 572; Planned 
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The First Amendment provides strong protections from governmental 
interference of speech.12 However, a state has the authority to reasonably 
regulate a physician’s speech through the power of licensing.13 This 
curtailment of physician speech is justified to ensure that physicians are 
knowledgeable and providing quality care.14 Although licensing allows 
states to implement reasonable regulation, physicians do not forfeit all of 
their constitutional rights while on the job—including their First 
Amendment rights.15 
Requiring a physician to obtain informed consent is one example of 
how a state regulates physician speech. Informed consent is the 
“opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the 
risks attendant upon each [option].”16 Legislators typically justify 
stringent abortion regulation by claiming that they are protecting women 
by ensuring informed consent to an abortion.17 However, recent abortion 
laws, such as the mandatory ultrasound laws described above, raise an 
important question: where does a state’s ability to mandate informed 
 
Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 727 (8th Cir. 2008). In each of these cases, 
the courts considered whether requiring a physician to perform an ultrasound, display a sonogram, 
and describe the fetus violated the physician’s First Amendment protected right against 
compelled speech. 
12. See infra Part I (discussing how the U.S. has stronger free speech protections than many other 
countries and the assumption is that speech is protected unless it falls into a particular exception); 
Stuart, 774 F.3d at 245 (“[W]e are mindful of ‘the First Amendment’s command that government 
regulation of speech must be measured in minimums, not maximums.’” (citing Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n 
of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 790 (1988)). 
13. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122–23 (1889); Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. 
(NIFLA) v. Becerra, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2382 (2018); Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. 
14. See Dent, 129 U.S. at 122–23; Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. 
15. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884; NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361 at 2374–75. 
16. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
17. See Yetter, supra note 6. Kentucky Governor Matt Bevin stated 
We applaud the decision by the Sixth Circuit, which affirms the commonsense notion that 
patients should be well equipped with relevant information before making important medical 
decisions. I am grateful to be governor of a state that values every human life, and we are 
committed to continue our fight on behalf of the most vulnerable among us. 
Id. And he discussed that “[a]t a previous hearing on the case, lawyer M. Stephen Pitt, Bevin’s general 
counsel, said the law was meant to protect women who might regret abortions or may not fully 
understand the procedure.” Id.; see also Judge: N.C. Abortion Ultrasound Law Illegal, USA TODAY 
(Jan. 18, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/01/18/ultrasound-law-north-
carolina/4630599/ [https://perma.cc/H6ST-LSS7] (“North Carolina legislators had argued that 
offering the ultrasound image to a woman seeking an abortion along with other information would 
promote childbirth. The law also would protect patients from potential coercion to have an abortion 
and emotional distress associated with the procedure, advocates said.”); Terry Baynes, Court Allows 
Texas Law on Ultrasound Before Abortion, REUTERS (Jan. 10, 2012), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-abortion-texas/court-allows-texas-law-on-ultrasound-before-
abortion-idUSTRE8091XF20120110  (Texas Governor Rick Perry, praised the ruling as a victory: 
“This important sonogram legislation ensures that every Texas woman seeking an abortion has all the 
facts about the life she is carrying.”). 
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consent end and the violation of a physician’s free speech rights begin? 
Alongside First Amendment principles are established medical 
practices that guide how much and what kind of information doctors 
should give patients to best inform their consent.18 There are two 
significant exceptions in this longstanding practice that dictate when a 
physician is not to provide information to a patient: the therapeutic 
privilege exception and patient waiver exception.19 The therapeutic 
privilege exception permits a physician to decline to share certain 
information that is part of an informed consent requirement when doing 
so would cause the patient serious psychological or physical harm.20 It is 
used sparingly, but is of great importance because it allows the physician 
to assess the unique circumstance of a given patient and determine when 
certain information would be particularly harmful.21 Additionally, the 
patient waiver exception allows the patient to determine how much 
information they personally need to make an informed decision.22 This 
exception permits the patient to refuse to hear some information that 
would otherwise be required because they know enough to make a fully 
informed decision.23 Emphasis on patient autonomy is a central tenant of 
informed consent.24 
This Comment demonstrates that regulations requiring ultrasounds 
before an abortion must include the therapeutic privilege and patient 
waiver exceptions to survive First Amendment scrutiny. Part I describes 
general principles of the First Amendment free speech protection and 
examines the doctrine of “professional speech.” Part II details how 
informed consent in the abortion context clashes with physicians’ First 
Amendment compelled speech protections. Part III argues that the 
longstanding informed consent exceptions for therapeutic privilege and 
patient waiver are necessary to protect physicians’ free speech rights 
under the First Amendment. 
 
18. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780–81; Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent 
and Abortion Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 235–36 (2009). 
19. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788–89; Le Jeune, supra note 6, at 534–35.  
20. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 254 (4th Cir. 2014); AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & 
GYNECOLOGISTS COMM. ON ETHICS, INFORMED CONSENT 7 (2009) [hereinafter ACOG], 
https://www.acog.org/Clinical-Guidance-and-Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-
Ethics/Informed-Consent [https://perma.cc/3FM8-Q3DK]; Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789. 
21. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789. 
22. Douglas Andrew Grimm, Informed Consent for All! No Exceptions, 37 N.M. L. REV. 39, 77, 
82 (2007) (arguing that no exceptions to informed consent should be permitted in the research 
context, but that exceptions “for informed consent to treatment should stand”). 
23. See id. at 77; ACOG, supra note 20, at 7; Manian, supra note 18, at 239 (discussing the right 
to refuse treatment). 
24. See Manian, supra note 18, at 235. 
Luke (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2020  9:38 PM 
2020] SONOGRAMS AND SPEECH 2031 
 
I. FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES AND THE DEVELOPING 
DOCTRINE OF PROFESSIONAL SPEECH 
The First Amendment prohibits federal and state government from 
abridging the freedom of speech.25 The United States has one of the oldest 
and strongest constitutional protections of free speech in the world.26 
While the road to current free speech protections has been rocky at 
times,27 Americans often hold free speech as one of this nation’s deepest 
and most treasured constitutional protections.28 However, the bounds of 
this protection are not always clear.29 The Supreme Court has attempted 
to define exactly what type of “speech” is protected, and when it is 
appropriate for the government to impede this freedom. Supreme Court 
precedent dictates that different tiers of scrutiny apply to certain types of 
speech. Yet, courts have struggled to balance professional regulation with 
core free speech values.30 
A. First Amendment Principles and the Different Standards Applied 
The First Amendment’s most obvious directive is that the government 
cannot restrict a person or entity from speaking; however, the First 
Amendment also prevents the government from compelling speech.31 The 
 
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding that the First 
Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
26. ALAN BROWNSTEIN & LESLIE GIELOW JACOBS, GLOBAL ISSUES IN FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND 
RELIGION 2–11 (2009). 
27. See NOAH R. FELDMAN & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 2–5 (7th 
ed. 2019). 
28. See Scott Raecker, Kristi Knous, Connie Ryan & Andrea Woodard, As Iowa Caucuses Arrive, 
We  Can  All  Demonstrate  Civility,  DES  MOINES  REG.  (Feb.  1,  2020),  https://www.desmoines 
register.com/story/opinion/columnists/iowa-view/2020/02/01/elections-2020-tense-moments-
civility-respect-character/2858492001/ [https://perma.cc/B2BH-5NQC]; Jeffrey M. McCall, Don’t 
Attend (or Donate to) a College that Restricts Free Expression, THE HILL (Jan. 29, 2020), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/education/480442-dont-attend-or-donate-to-a-college-that-restricts-free-
expression [https://perma.cc/3KLF-L89U]; Tony Semerad, Free Expression—Not ‘Censorship’—
Will Best Protect Democracy, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg Tells Utah Audience, SALT LAKE 
TRIB. (Feb. 1, 2020), https://www.sltrib.com/news/2020/02/01/free-expression-not. 
29. The treatment of professional speech is a great example of this lack of clarity. See, e.g., EMW 
Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 432–35 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 
EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Meier, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 655 (2019) (discussing how the 
Fifth and Eighth Circuits interpret the First Amendment’s free speech protection applied 
to physicians). 
30. See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. (NIFLA) v. Becerra, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2375 (2018). 
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) 
(holding that local authorities compelling a flag salute in schools violates the First Amendment’s 
protection of free speech). 
Luke (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2020  9:38 PM 
2032 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:2027 
 
Court has long recognized that the First Amendment “guarantees 
‘freedom of speech,’ a term necessarily comprising the decision of both 
what to say and what not to say.”32 The government cannot force a person 
or entity to be a mouthpiece for the message of the state—regardless of 
whether the message is a fact or opinion.33 
Over time, First Amendment jurisprudence has incorporated formal 
standards of review as a mechanism to evaluate free speech cases—
borrowing this doctrinal tool from the Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection arena.34 “Strict scrutiny” is the highest standard of review and 
requires that the government prove that the law is “narrowly tailored” to 
serve a “compelling governmental interest.”35 On the other side of strict 
scrutiny is “rational basis review,” which upholds legislation so long as it 
is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”36 While rational basis 
review plays a limited role in free speech cases, the role of strict scrutiny 
was solidified in First Amendment jurisprudence in the 1980s, with the 
Court employing this standard of review to all regulations that 
categorically restrict or compel a certain type of speech.37 However, First 
Amendment jurisprudence can be muddled because of centuries old 
precedent and the newer use of tiers of review—often resulting in scholars 
and courts trying post-hoc to label established precedent with these 
conventional forms of scrutiny. 
While the application of strict scrutiny is usually fatal for a law,38 the 
Supreme Court has gradually designated new categories of speech that do 
not require such high scrutiny.39 There are many categories of speech that 
the Court has decided should not receive heightened scrutiny because “[it] 
has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth 
 
32. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988) (emphasis in original) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I). 
33. See id. at 797–98 (“These cases cannot be distinguished simply because they involved 
compelled statements of opinion while here we deal with compelled statements of ‘fact’: either form 
of compulsion burdens protected speech.”). 
34. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test that Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 785–87 (2007). 
35. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 171 (2015). 
36. See City of New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); Bhagwat, supra note 34, at 786. 
37. Bhagwat, supra note 34, at 784, 787; Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461–62 (1980). 
38. Matthew D. Bunker, Clay Calvert & William C. Nevin, Strict in Theory, but Feeble in Fact? 
First Amendment Strict Scrutiny and the Protection of Speech, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 349, 351 (2011). 
39. See id. at 357 (arguing that there are four categories where courts can avoid the application of 
strict scrutiny: “classifying a regulation as content neutral rather than content based; characterizing 
speech as either low value or devoid of any protection; treating the speaker as a second-class citizen; 
and deeming the regulation to be one of general applicability such that any restriction on speech is 
merely incidental”). 
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that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by 
the social interest in order and morality.”40 Examples of types of speech 
that do not receive any First Amendment protection are obscenity, 
incitement, fighting words, and child pornography.41 While some scholars 
have later gone back and applied a rational basis typography to these 
categories of speech, they are generally known to simply receive no 
protection under the First Amendment.42 
The inflexibility of either strict scrutiny or no scrutiny at all became 
readily apparent.43 The Court began trying to strike a balance by creating 
unique hyper-specific tests that each apply to certain types of speech—
never creating a generally-applicable intermediate standard.44 
Intermediate scrutiny, in its traditional equal protection context, requires 
an “important governmental” objective that must be “substantially 
related” to the achievement of that objective.45 As more middle-ground 
exceptions have emerged, lower courts and scholars began to argue that 
these standards are effectively different variations of traditional 
intermediate scrutiny.46 Despite the speech-specific tests varying in 
precise language and terminology, they all seek the same thing: that a 
 
40. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
41. Bhagwat, supra note 34, at 787–88 n.22 (first citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 747 
(1982) (holding that child pornography does not receive First Amendment protection because of 
states’ interests in protecting children); then citing Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) 
(discussing the principle that the constitutional guarantee of free speech only allows a state to regulate 
where an activity is likely to incite or produce imminent lawless action); then citing Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally 
protected speech); and then citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (upholding a 
statute that prohibited the use of fighting words in public places)).  
42. See Bunker et al., supra note 38, at 361. 
43. See Bhagwat, supra note 34, at 787–800 (explaining the history on the creation of intermediate 
scrutiny in First Amendment law). For example, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Court created 
a four-part balancing test for “time, place, manner” restrictions to accommodate the government’s 
interest in regulating public spaces. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). Similarly, in United States v. O’Brien, the 
Court created a four-part intermediate-like test to grapple with situations where conduct acts as 
symbolic speech. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
44. See Bhagwat, supra note 34, at 787–00. Examples of these certain type of speech are: time, 
place, and manner restrictions; symbolic conduct; regulations of mass media; commercial speech; 
charitable solicitation; political contributions; sexually oriented businesses; and speech of 
government employees. Id. at 809–16. 
45. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
46. See Bhagwat, supra note 34, at 785; Suzanne A. Kim, Suzette Richards & Rachel L. Jensen, 
Equal Protection, 1 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 213, 219–20 (2000); Clay Calvert & Minch Minchin, Can 
the Undue-Burden Standard Add Clarity and Rigor to Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence? A Proposal Cutting Across Constitutional Domains for Time, Place & Manner 
Regulations, 69 OKLA. L. REV. 623, 624–28 (2017); Wynter K. Miller & Benjamin E. Berkman, The 
Future of Physicians’ First Amendment Freedom: Professional Speech in an Era of Radically 
Expanded Prenatal Genetic Testing, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 577, 610–11 (2019). 
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regulation is related to the government interest espoused.47 
The substantially related prong of intermediate scrutiny essentially 
requires that the means used “fit” the governmental end.48 There is no 
formal “substantial relationship” test for intermediate scrutiny, but courts 
often use the strict scrutiny framework as a loose guide.49 In a strict 
scrutiny analysis there are three prongs to narrow tailoring: (1) whether 
the regulation is overinclusive, or restricts more speech than necessary to 
achieve its goal; (2) whether the regulation is underinclusive, or does not 
restrict speech that would be equally harmful to the government’s interest; 
(3) and whether the “least restrictive means” has been chosen to achieve 
the stated interest.50 These prongs are used, but less stringently applied, in 
an intermediate scrutiny analysis.51 
As an example of the type of “fit” sought by intermediate scrutiny, the 
test for a law or regulation that poses a restriction on the time, place, or 
manner of speech52 requires in part that it is not “substantially broader 
than necessary to achieve the government’s interest.”53 In contrast, for 
symbolic conduct,54 the test examines “if the incidental restriction on 
 
47. See Bhagwat, supra note 34, at 801 (“Instead, the Supreme Court has come to emphasize the 
fact that despite somewhat differing formulations, many of the Court’s new ‘tests’ share some basic, 
common characteristics: under these tests, laws will be upheld so long as they serve some sort of a 
significant/substantial/important governmental interest and are reasonably well tailored to that 
purpose (i.e., not unreasonably overbroad).”). 
48. See Kim et al., supra note 46, at 232–33. 
49. Id.; see Bhagwat, supra note 34, at 787–800 (describing how the Court typically modified strict 
scrutiny to create a specific intermediate-like test for different categories of speech). 
50. Bunker et al., supra note 38, at 372–73. 
51. Bhagwat, supra note 34, at 789 (noting that the “narrowly tailored” aspect of the intermediate 
scrutiny test does not require the chosen regulatory means to be the “least restrictive means” to 
achieving its goals); Calvert & Minchin, supra note 46, at 629 (“[S]trict scrutiny demands that the 
statute restricts no more speech than is absolutely necessary to serve the interest, while the fit need 
not be quite so precise under intermediate scrutiny.”); Miller & Berkman, supra note 46, at 611 
(stating that the “track record of outcomes is mixed” under intermediate scrutiny (quoting Kathleen 
M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Role of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 
293, 297 (1992))). 
52. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“Our cases make clear, however, 
that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or 
manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified without reference to the content of 
the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and 
that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.’” (quoting 
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984))). 
53. Bhagwat, supra note 34, at 789 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 800). 
54. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (upholding the conviction of 
an individual who publicly burned his draft card in protest of the Vietnam War after the Court noted 
that “when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a 
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify 
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms”). For symbolic conduct, the Court uses a type 
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alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest.”55 Further, for commercial speech,56 one 
prong of the test requires that the governmental interest cannot “be served 
as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech.”57 While each 
of these tests for these different categories of speech have their own 
language and nuance, they all require some kind of fit between the 
government interest and the means used. 
Justice Scalia remarked that intermediate scrutiny has become “some 
kind of default standard”58 for speech that is “not readily categorizable.”59 
It has been highly criticized as being overly malleable, uncertain, and rife 
for judicial activism.60 Especially in the free speech context, the variation 
of language in each intermediate scrutiny test and the lack of one 
identifiable standard is in part to blame for the ambiguity in this area of 
law.61 
 
of intermediate scrutiny that looks to whether the government has an “important or substantial” 
interest, whether the regulation is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and whether the 
incidental restriction on expression is no greater than is essential to further that interest. Id. at 377.  
55. Id. at 377.  
56. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
The Court created a four-part test for commercial speech: 
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. 
For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and 
not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both 
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve 
that interest. 
Id.; see also Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (holding that governmental restrictions on 
commercial speech need not be “necessarily the least restrictive means but, as we have put it in the 
other contexts discussed above, a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective”); Va. 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (explaining 
commercial speech is generally considered speech that does no more than propose a commercial 
transaction or relate solely to the speaker’s and audience’s economic interests). The commercial 
speech doctrine was created to accommodate the government’s interest in protecting consumers. See 
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 783. Commercial speech is thought to be more durable and 
hardier than other types of speech because of the speaker’s economic interest. See id. at 771 n.24. 
Therefore, commercial speech receives a type of intermediate scrutiny to accommodate this interest 
in protecting consumers while also protecting commercial actors’ free speech rights. Cent. Hudson 
Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 561–66.  
57. Bhagwat, supra note 34, at 794 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564). 
58. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 792 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
59. See Miller & Berkman, supra note 46, at 613. 
60. Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 301 (1998). 
61. See Bhagwat, supra note 34, at 787–801 (detailing the different intermediate-like standards of 
scrutiny that have emerged and how there is a lack of consensus on what intermediate scrutiny in First 
Amendment law entails or when it is applied).  
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B. Professional Speech as an Emerging Doctrine 
Some lower courts and scholars have argued that “professional speech” 
should be recognized as a new category of speech that receives a type of 
specifically designed intermediate scrutiny.62 A “professional” is 
generally defined as an “individual[] who provide[s] personalized services 
to clients and who [is] subject to ‘a generally applicable licensing and 
regulatory regime.’”63 In 1889, the Supreme Court upheld a state’s ability 
to require professional licensing in Dent v. West Virginia.64 The Supreme 
Court justified the licensing of medical professionals based on the states’ 
interest in securing the general welfare “against the consequences of 
ignorance and incapacity, as well as of deception and fraud.”65 So long as 
the qualifications were “appropriate to the calling or profession, and 
attainable by reasonable study or application, no objection to their validity 
can be raised because of their stringency or difficulty.”66 
The states’ licensing regulatory power that was born in Dent 
acknowledged the government’s ability to restrict professionals’ rights for 
the greater good of society.67 Professional licensing laws typically 
determine who may enter the profession, who may remain in that 
profession, and what constitutes appropriate practice.68 Typical examples 
of licensed professionals are doctors, attorneys, and accountants; but 
hundreds of professionals are licensed by the state, from real estate 
brokers to barbers.69 While the licensing regulation might just require a 
person to pass a test to enter the profession, the state can go so far as to 
dictate the exact words a professional must disclose to a client.70 
 
62. See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 249 (4th Cir. 2014) (“A heightened intermediate level of 
scrutiny is thus consistent with Supreme Court precedent and appropriately recognizes the intersection 
here of regulation of speech and regulation of the medical profession in the context of an abortion 
procedure.”); Carl H. Coleman, Regulating Physician Speech, 97 N.C. L. REV. 843, 843 (2019) 
(proposing “that courts should apply intermediate scrutiny to all laws interfering with any aspect of 
physician-patient communications”). 
63. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. (NIFLA) v. Becerra, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 
(2018) (quoting Moore-King v. Cnty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 569 (4th Cir. 2013)). 
64. 129 U.S. 114 (1889). 
65. Id. at 122. 
66. Id.  
67. Id. at 123.  
68. See Erika Schutzman, We Need Professional Help: Advocating for a Consistent Standard of 
Review When Regulations of Professional Speech Implicate the First Amendment, 56 B.C. L. REV. 
2019, 2032–33 (2019). 
69. Id. 
70. See id. at 2034; see, e.g., EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 424 
(6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Meier, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 
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However, a professional does not entirely relinquish their First 
Amendment rights upon obtaining a license.71 This creates tension 
between a state’s well-recognized ability to regulate physician speech 
under reasonable licensing regulations and the broad free speech 
principles that prevent a state from compelling or restricting a person’s 
speech. In an attempt to balance these differing principles, lower courts 
have created the category called “professional speech” that, similar to 
commercial speech, receives an intermediate-like scrutiny. 
The theory of professional speech is rooted in Justice Robert Jackson’s 
1945 concurrence in Thomas v. Collins.72 Jackson agreed with the 
majority that the government could not require a speaker to get a license 
before giving a public speech, but he opined that “a rough distinction 
always exists” between the permissible licensing of a vocation and the 
impermissible regulation of speech.73 In 1985, Justice Byron White wrote 
a concurrence in Lowe v. Securities Exchange Commission,74 a case 
decided on statutory grounds, that distinguished public speech from 
speech targeted at a private individual.75 Justice White found no problem 
with “‘generally applicable licensing provisions limiting the class of 
persons who may practice [a] profession,’ even where the practice of that 
profession consists entirely of speaking.”76 
Lower courts have used the concurrences of these seminal cases to 
define the boundaries and doctrine of professional speech.77 For example, 
in Pickup v. Brown,78 the Ninth Circuit found that talk therapy was a form 
of professional conduct, not speech, and therefore, it was not entitled to 
 
655 (2019) (discussing a law that requires a doctor to explain ultrasound images to patients prior to 
giving abortions); Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014) (describing a law that requires 
physicians to describe ultrasound images to patients seeking abortions); Tex. Med. Providers 
Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that narrated 
ultrasounds are an appropriate use of government licensing powers). 
71. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. (NIFLA) v. Becerra, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371–72 
(2018) (“Speech is not unprotected merely because it is uttered by ‘professionals.’”). 
72. 323 U.S. 516, 544–48 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
73. Robert McNamara & Paul Sherman, NIFLA v. Becerra: A Seismic Decision Protecting 
Occupational Speech, 2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 197, 206 (2018) (quoting Thomas, 323 U.S. at 544 
(Jackson, J., concurring)). 
74. 472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985) (White, J., concurring). 
75. See id. at 187–89 (majority opinion). 
76. See McNamara & Sherman, supra note 73, at 207 (quoting Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., 
concurring)). 
77. See id. at 208–09 (explaining how lower courts have used and expanded Justice White’s 
concurrence in Lowe); Coleman, supra note 62, at 846 (discussing how some lower courts suggest 
that physicians’ communications with their patients are entitled no First Amendment protection 
(citing Lowe, 472 U.S. at 233 (White, J., concurring))). 
78. 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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First Amendment protection.79 Thus, California’s ban on conversion 
therapy80 was upheld as a reasonable regulation of a profession.81 In 
contrast, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a Florida law that prohibited a 
physician from asking about a patient’s gun ownership when doing so was 
“not relevant” to their medical care.82 The Eleventh Circuit did not 
determine whether strict scrutiny applied because the statute failed even 
the more lenient intermediate scrutiny.83 
Thus, lower courts have struggled with defining and discerning 
professional speech—particularly in the context of the growing legal 
challenges to restrictive abortion regulations.84 Abortion regulations pose 
a unique challenge because government officials often use the concept of 
informed consent to justify the compulsion of physician speech.85 The 
Supreme Court had not directly grappled with the doctrine of 
“professional speech”86 until 2018, in National Institute of Family & Life 
Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra.87 In NIFLA, the Court refused to create a 
new category of “professional speech” that receives lower scrutiny; 
however, the Court mentioned that “professional conduct”—referencing 
regulations of informed consent—does receive a lower form of scrutiny.88 
 
79. Id. at 1048.   
80. See id. at 1048–49. The Ninth Circuit defined conversion therapy as: 
a variety of methods, including both aversive and non-aversive treatments, that share the goal of 
changing an individual’s sexual orientation from homosexual to heterosexual. In the past, 
aversive treatments included inducing nausea, vomiting, or paralysis; providing electric shocks; 
or having an individual snap an elastic band around the wrist when aroused by same-sex erotic 
images or thoughts. Even more drastic methods, such as castration, have been used. Today, some 
non-aversive treatments use assertiveness and affection training with physical and social 
reinforcement to increase other-sex sexual behaviors. 
Id. 
81. See id. at 1055; McNamara & Sherman, supra note 73, at 204. 
82. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1302 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting FLA. STAT. 
§ 790.338(1) (2011)). 
83. See id. at 1311–13 (“We now turn to FOPA’s record-keeping, inquiry, and anti-harassment 
provisions. Because these provisions fail to satisfy heightened scrutiny under Sorrell, they obviously 
would not withstand strict scrutiny. We therefore need not decide whether strict scrutiny should 
apply.”). 
84. See infra Part II. 
85. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
86. See Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1258 (2016) (stating that as 
of 2016, whether a professional speech doctrine existed was “subject to debate”); Nat’l Inst. of Fam. 
& Life Advocs. (NIFLA) v. Becerra, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018) (discussing how the 
Supreme Court has alluded to professional speech in previous cases like Casey); cf. Conant v. 
McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 694 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (“Although the Supreme Court has never held that 
the physician-patient relationship, as such, receives special First Amendment protection, its case law 
assumes, without so deciding, that the relationship is a protected one.”). 
87. __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
88. See id. at 2372. 
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II. THE PROFESSIONAL SPEECH DILEMMA: INFORMED 
CONSENT AND ANTI-ABORTION LEGISLATION 
Informed consent has been an integral part of medical practice for 
decades.89 As the understanding of informed consent has evolved, 
physicians and medical practitioners have shifted towards a patient-
centric view of informed consent90: “the test for determining whether a 
particular peril must be divulged is its materiality to the patient’s 
decision.”91 As government officials invoke informed consent as a 
justification for restrictive abortion regulations,92 courts are left to 
struggle to balance this established medical practice with a physician’s 
legal protections. Lower courts have historically struck this balance by 
creating a type of intermediate scrutiny that applies to all professional 
speech.93 However, in the recent NIFLA case, the Supreme Court 
foreclosed the opportunity to create a new category of speech altogether.94 
But, in an ambiguous aside, the Court simultaneously noted that some 
form of lesser scrutiny still applies to informed consent provisions.95 
A. Acquiring Informed Consent 
It is standard medical practice for a physician to inform a patient of the 
basic risks and alternatives to any procedure so that the patient can consent 
to the procedure knowing the fundamental facts.96 However, the 
politicization of abortion has called into question what it takes to properly 
acquire informed consent.97 Many abortion regulations are passed under 
the justification that they are necessary to properly inform consent—even 
though many of these regulations go far beyond what constitutes informed 
 
89. See Samuel D. Hodge, Jr. & Maria Zambrano Steinhaus, The Ever-Changing Landscape of 
Informed Consent and Whether the Obligation to Explain a Procedure to the Patient May Be 
Delegated, 71 ARK. L. REV. 727, 730–31 (2019). 
90. See id. at 731.  
91. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786–87 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
92. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
93. See infra section II.B.1. 
94. See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. (NIFLA) v. Becerra, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375 
(2018). 
95. See id. at 2372. 
96. See Informed Consent: Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.1.1, AM. MED. ASS’N (Nov. 14, 2016) 
[hereinafter Informed  Consent],  https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/informed-consent 
[https://perma.cc/BQ3E-JHQT]; ACOG, supra note 20, at 3. 
97. For more on the politicization of abortion, see Jill Lepore, How Abortion and Birth Control 
Became Politicized, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 9, 2011), https://www.npr.org/2011/11/09/ 
142097521/how-birth-control-and-abortion-became-politicized [https://perma.cc/TL9Z-NREB]. 
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consent in every other medical context.98 These regulations have spurred 
litigation to attempt to define the boundaries of what a patient must know, 
or does not need to know, to give fully informed consent.99 
1. Overview of Informed Consent Principles 
One of the earliest appearances of informed consent as a legal concept 
was in 1914, when Justice Cardozo opined that “[e]very human being of 
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done 
with [their] own body.”100 This concept, which was incorporated over time 
into common law,101 recognizes patient autonomy and the ability of a 
patient to make a decision for themselves.102 Generally, such legislation 
requires the physician to tell the patient of the dangers, advantages, and 
alternatives to a specific treatment and obtain authorization before 
proceeding.103 
Under common law, informed consent entails the disclosure of all 
material risks.104 “Material” is defined as information that a reasonable 
person would likely find significant in deciding whether or not to forego 
the proposed therapy.105 Reasonableness is typically determined from the 
perspective of the patient.106 
The American Medical Association (AMA) details in three parts how 
a physician should obtain informed consent: (1) “[a]ssess the patient’s 
ability to understand relevant medical information and the implications of 
treatment alternatives and to make an independent, voluntary decision”; 
(2) “[p]resent relevant information accurately and sensitively, in keeping 
with the patient’s preferences for receiving medical information”; and 
 
98. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; Grimm, supra note 22, at 43–44 (describing the 
primary elements that most medical ethicists view as necessary for proper informed consent). 
99. See infra section II.B.1. 
100. Hodge & Steinhaus, supra note 89, at 729 (quoting Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 
N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated by Bing v. Thunig, 142 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957)). 
101. See Grimm, supra note 22, at 40; Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1101–02 (Kan. 1960) 
(discussing a physician’s fiduciary duty to get their patients informed consent in a malpractice 
negligence action); Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 13 (Minn. 1905) (discussing the implications of 
informed consent in a civil assault and battery action), overruled in part by Genzel v. Halvorson, 80 
N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 1957). 
102. See Manian, supra note 18, at 226; Grimm, supra note 22, at 59; Canterbury v. Spence, 464 
F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
103. See Hodge & Steinhaus, supra note 89, at 732–33. Note that although there are different and 
heightened standards of informed consent for research studies, this Comment focuses on treatment-
based informed consent. Grimm, supra note 22, at 42–43. 
104. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786–87. 
105. Id. at 787 (quoting Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Sheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 
NW. U. L. REV. 628, 640 (1970)). 
106. Id. at 787; Coleman, supra note 62, at 890. 
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(3) “[d]ocument the informed consent conversation and the patient’s (or 
surrogate’s) decision in the medical record in some manner.”107 The 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) 
recognizes that the adequacy of information will depend on the “common 
practice of the profession,” what a reasonable patient would want, and 
what that unique patient’s subjective needs are.108 
There are certain situations when a physician cannot obtain informed 
consent or it is not feasible to obtain informed consent, resulting in 
carveouts of this otherwise steadfast requirement.109 The most common 
exceptions are when: (1) informed consent is assumed during the 
diagnostic phase of therapy,110 (2) there is an emergency situation and the 
patient is incapacitated,111 (3) the physician claims a therapeutic privilege, 
or (4) a patient voluntarily waives informed consent.112 This Comment 
focuses on the latter two of these exceptions. 
The therapeutic privilege exception typically applies when the 
information would be detrimental to the patient’s mental well-being.113 
This exception was acknowledged in the seminal informed consent case 
Canterbury v. Spence,114 where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit noted that the critical inquiry is “whether the physician responded 
to a sound medical judgment that communication of the risk information 
would present a threat to the patient’s well-being.”115 The AMA also 
presents guidelines on when to withhold information from a patient, 
which includes instructions to “[a]ssess[] the amount of information the 
patient is capable of receiving at a given time, and tailor disclosure to meet 
the patient’s needs and expectations in keeping with the individual’s 
preferences.”116 
 
107. See Informed Consent, supra note 96.  
108. See ACOG, supra note 20, at 5. 
109. See Grimm, supra note 22, at 65. 
110. See id. at 65–66. The diagnostic privilege exception assumes consent for routine physical 
exams that are minimally invasive, like drawing blood or taking a temperature. Id. This exception is 
outside the scope of this Comment.  
111. See id. at 65. The emergency exception is used when the patient is unconscious or incapable 
of consenting and “harm from a failure to treat is imminent and outweighs any harm threatened by 
the proposed treatment.” Id. at 70 (quoting Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788). This exception is outside 
the scope of this Comment. 
112. See id. at 76. 
113. See id.; Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789 (“It is recognized that patients occasionally become so 
ill or emotionally distraught on disclosure as to foreclose a rational decision, or complicate or hinder 
the treatment, or perhaps even pose psychological damage to the patient.”). 
114. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
115. Id. at 789. 
116. Withholding Information from Patients: Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.1.3, AM. MED. 
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The patient waiver exception entails a patient’s right to refuse to 
receive information regarding their care, waive their right to make 
decisions about their care, or waive receiving care at all.117 This exception 
is grounded in the notion of patient autonomy—the idea that the patient 
can make the best decision for themself, even without all the 
information.118 The AMA stipulates that a physician must “[h]onor a 
patient’s request not to receive certain medical information.”119 
These few exceptions carve out the otherwise firm doctrine that 
informed consent is required before any treatment. Informed consent and 
the exceptions therein have been incorporated into common law, state law, 
and private medical association governing rules.120 
2. Informed Consent in the Abortion Context 
Informed consent operates differently in the realm of abortion than in 
any other medical context.121 States have grown bold in passing restrictive 
abortion laws and many government officials claim that the goal of these 
measures is to better inform the consent of the patient.122 Such laws 
include mandatory waiting periods, gestational time limits, counseling 
before an abortion, and ultrasounds before an abortion.123 Proponents of 
restrictive abortion laws argue that these provisions are necessary to 
protect the potential life of a fetus against a rushed and uninformed patient 
decision.124 However, critics counter that these laws are just thinly veiled 
attempts at restricting abortion.125 Some critics also claim that there is a 
 
ASS’N,  https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/withholding-information-patients 
[https://perma.cc/6U2X-PDGM]. 
117. Grimm, supra note 22, at 77; ACOG, supra note 20, at 7; Manian, supra note 18, at 239 
(discussing the right to refuse treatment). 
118. Grimm, supra note 22, at 77–78. 
119. Withholding Information from Patients, supra note 116. 
120. See id.; Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 772; Hodge, supra note 89, at 732 (noting state informed 
consent laws); ACOG, supra note 20. 
121. See Manian, supra note 18, at 224. 
122. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; Whitney D. Pile, The Right to Remain Silent: A 
First Amendment Analysis of Abortion Informed Consent Laws, 73 MO. L. REV. 243, 243–44 (2008). 
123. An Overview of Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 1, 2020), https://www. 
guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/overview-abortion-laws [https://perma.cc/4FPN-VW6T]; see 
supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
124. Pile, supra note 122, at 243–44. 
125. See Debbie Elliot & Laurel Wamsley, Alabama Governor Signs Abortion Ban into Law, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 14, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/14/723312937/alabama-
lawmakers-passes-abortion-ban [https://perma.cc/XE6E-7DMU] (“The amendment has divided 
Republicans. Lt. Gov. Will Ainsworth, who presides over the Senate, posted on Twitter that his 
position is simple—‘Abortion is murder.’”); Will Doran, NC Abortion Law Is Unconstitutional, 
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paternalistic justification at work—namely, that women are ill-equipped 
to make this medical and moral judgment on their own.126 These laws put 
abortion providers in the tricky position of providing a service that their 
patients want, while also comporting with all state-imposed informed 
consent laws—with the risk of prosecution if they fail to comply.127 
The concept of informed consent is grounded in the understanding that 
a reasonable patient is also a subjective patient who comes from their own 
experience.128 A patient might want certain information based on their 
own personal experience and the unique context of that procedure.129 In 
particular, abortions have heavy religious and political implications that 
add to the emotional weight of the decision in ways that are unlike many 
other medical procedures.130 Patients receive abortions for a whole host of 
reasons: they became pregnant from rape, they are too young or 
financially unstable to have a child, they just do not want a child at that 
time, the fetus is non-viable, or carrying the pregnancy will be medically 
dangerous.131 A physician must determine what type of information is 
necessary or relevant for the patient to make a properly informed decision, 
 
Federal Court Rules, NEWS & OBSERVER  (Mar.  26,  2019),  www.newsobserver.com/news/politic
s-government/article 228421354.html#storylink=cpy (“Rev. Mark Creech, a Baptist preacher who 
leads the NC Christian Action League, said that regardless of the judge’s ruling, ‘history will one day 
condemn those who defend what all people will someday recognize to have been the wanton killing 
of innocent children.’”); Kate Smith, Louisiana Has Passed Nearly 100 Anti-
Abortion  Restrictions  Since  Roe  v.  Wade,  CBS  NEWS  (Feb.  11,  2020),  https://www.cbsnews.
com/news/louisiana-nearly-100-anti-abortion-restrictions-roe-v-wade-exclusive/ 
[https://perma.cc/BN35-S5T5] (“‘The history of Louisiana’s abortion restrictions are in fact a history 
of attempts to ban abortion, it’s not about giving care to patients,’ Nash said. ‘What we’re trying to 
say is that the legislature’s intent has been to regulate abortion out of existence. That’s been 
the pattern.’”). 
126. Pile, supra note 122, at 243–44. 
127. Jen Gunter, Medical School Doesn’t Teach the ‘Woman’s Life Is in Danger’ Curriculum, N.Y. 
TIMES  (May  20,  2019),  https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/20/opinion/abortion-laws.html 
[https://perma.cc/A4XP-QVS9]. 
128. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786–87 (D.C. Cir. 1972); ACOG, supra note 20, at 5. 
129. ACOG, supra note 20, at 5; see Informed Consent, supra note 96. 
130. Carmen Fishwick, Why We Need to Talk About Abortion: Eight Women Share Their 
Experiences, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/09/why-
we-need-to-talk-about-abortion-eight-women-share-their-experiences  [https://perma.cc/4NVY-
PWPQ] (discussing the stigma around having an abortion: “The fact that even progressive, outspoken, 
pro-choice feminists feel the pressure to keep our abortions under wraps – to speak about them only 
in corners, in murmurs, in private with our closest confidantes – means that opponents of abortion get 
to define it however suits them best”). 
131. Lawrence B. Finer, Lori F. Frohwirth, Lindsay A. Dauphinee, Susheela Singh & Ann M. 
Moore, Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSPS. 
ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 110 (2005); Christina Zdanowicz, Women Have Abortions for Many 
Reasons Aside from Rape and Incest. Here Are Some of Them, CNN (May 22, 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/21/health/women-reasons-abortion-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 
VPS2-9U93]. 
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keeping in mind the subjective situation of each individual patient.132 
The landmark case on informed consent in abortion procedures is 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, where the 
plaintiffs challenged a Pennsylvania statute that was passed under the 
guise of informed consent.133 Casey upheld the holding in Roe v. Wade134 
that a pregnant person has a fundamental right under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to receive an abortion.135 While 
Casey upheld this right to an abortion, it also affirmed the right of 
legislatures to pass laws regulating abortion procedures—so long as the 
regulation does not amount to an “undue burden” to receiving an 
abortion.136 Ultimately, Casey upheld most of the challenged 
Pennsylvania informed consent law as not unduly burdensome under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.137 
The Pennsylvania informed consent statute challenged in Casey 
required, in part, that the doctor orally inform the patient, at least twenty-
four hours before the procedure, about the nature of the abortion 
procedure, the risks and alternatives that a “reasonable patient” would 
consider material when deciding whether to have the abortion, the risks 
of carrying the child to term, and the “probable gestational age” of the 
fetus at the time the abortion would be performed.138 The statute also 
required informing the patient of the availability of a state printed 
pamphlet.139 
Importantly, the Pennsylvania statute included an exception: the 
physician need not provide all of this information “if he or she can 
demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she 
reasonably believed that furnishing the information would have resulted 
in a severely adverse effect on the physical or mental health of the 
 
132. ACOG, supra note 20, at 5; see Informed Consent, supra note 96. 
133. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 833 (1992). 
134. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
135. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
136. Id. at 874. The Court in Casey actually expanded the right of legislatures to pass restrictive 
informed consent laws, overturning prior precedent that had found certain informed consent laws 
unconstitutional under Roe. See Manian, supra note 18, at 244–49.  
137. Casey, 505 U.S. at 893–95 (upholding all of Pennsylvania’s informed consent law except a 
provision that required spousal consent before receiving an abortion). 
138. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205(a)(1) (2020); Casey, 505 U.S. at 844. Additionally, the statute 
requires the physician to provide information on financial assistance that may be available from the 
state and the father. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205(a)(2)–(3). 
139. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205(a)(2). The statute also required that the physician must inform the 
patient that the state has printed materials that describe the unborn child and that the physician must 
give the patient a copy if the patient requests. Id. § 3205(a)(2)–(3). 
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patient.”140 The Court in Casey noted that, because of this exception, “the 
statute does not prevent the physician from exercising his or her medical 
judgment.”141 
While the Court mostly grappled with the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause, it added a short response to the petitioner’s First 
Amendment claim. The Court simultaneously acknowledged both a 
physician’s free speech rights as well as state’s ability to require 
reasonable licensing regulations: 
All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First 
Amendment right of a physician not to provide information about 
the risks of abortion, and child-birth, in a manner mandated by the 
State. To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights not to 
speak are implicated, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 97 
S. Ct. 1428, 51 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1977), but only as part of the 
practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and 
regulation by the State, cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603, 97 
S. Ct. 869, 51 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1977). We see no constitutional 
infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the 
information mandated by the State here.142 
This one paragraph is all that the Casey Court said about the First 
Amendment claim.143 The Court upheld the particular statute at issue on 
First Amendment grounds and said no more. 
B. The NIFLA Complication: When Informed Consent Meets 
Professional Speech 
Lower courts have historically applied the professional speech doctrine 
to abortion informed consent cases and used a variety of intermediate 
scrutiny tests. However, in 2018 the Supreme Court decided NIFLA v. 
Becerra, where the Court refused to acknowledge “professional speech” 
as a category of speech afforded less than strict scrutiny.144 However, the 
Court acknowledged an exception for “professional conduct,” with the 
implied inclusion of informed consent regulations.145 Lower courts have 
been left to discern what standard applies to this “professional conduct.” 
 
140. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883–84; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205(c). 
141. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. (NIFLA) v. Becerra, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2375(2018). 
145. Id. at 2372. 
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1. Before NIFLA, Courts Struggled to Discern a Standard for 
Abortion Ultrasound Regulations 
Abortion regulation has been an area of particular conflict as legislators 
pass new and innovative restrictions on access to abortion—placing heavy 
burdens on physicians to provide a safe service while also complying with 
nuanced regulations. 
In 2008 in Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South 
Dakota v. Rounds,146 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a South 
Dakota informed consent law that required a doctor to acquire a signed 
statement from the patient.147 The required statement needed to include 
information such as the increase in risk of depression and suicide 
associated with abortion148 and notice that the patient will be terminating 
“the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.”149 The Rounds 
Court found that an abortion informed consent statute can stand under the 
First Amendment so long as it is not “untruthful, misleading or not 
relevant to the patient’s decision to have an abortion.”150 The court pointed 
to Casey for this truthful, non-misleading, and relevant standard.151 
Ultimately, the Rounds Court found that the required signing of the 
statement was part of the state’s power to reasonably regulate speech and 
it did not impede on the physician’s First Amendment rights.152 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2012 upheld a Texas informed 
consent law against a First Amendment challenge in Texas Medical 
Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey.153 The statute, in part, 
required the physician who was to conduct the abortion to perform and 
display a sonogram of the fetus, to play the sound of the “heart 
auscultation” of the fetus, and to explain the results of the procedures.154 
The patient can choose to not listen to the “heartbeat” by plugging their 
ears, but they are required to listen to the explanation of the sonogram 
 
146. 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008). 
147. Id. at 727, 738.  
148. Id. Abortion is not a statistically significant predictor of subsequent anxiety, mood, impulse-
control, and eating disorders or suicidal ideation. Julia R. Steinberg, Charles E. McCulloch & Nancy 
E. Adler, Abortion and Mental Health: Findings from The National Comorbidity Survey-Replication, 
123 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 263, 263 (2014). 
149. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 726. 
150. Id. at 735. 
151. Id. at 734–35. 
152. Id. at 738. 
153. 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012). 
154. Id. at 573. 
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except under three narrow exceptions.155 Despite the more intrusive nature 
of this informed consent provision, the court upheld it under a similar 
truthful, non-misleading, and relevant standard as Rounds.156 The Fifth 
Circuit found that the informed consent provisions did not require strict 
scrutiny and that this provision was not substantially different than the 
informed consent provision at issue in Casey.157 
In contrast, in 2014, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Stuart v. 
Camnitz158 took up a case involving a North Carolina ultrasound statute 
similar to the one in Lakey. The case also involved a similar compelled-
speech infringement claim.159 This statute required the physician to 
perform an ultrasound prior to an abortion, display the sonogram, describe 
the fetus in detail, and offer to play the audio of the fetal heart tone.160 
Though the patient may avert their eyes, the ultrasound must be 
performed, except in the case of a medical emergency.161 The court said 
of professional speech rights that “the stringency of review [for 
professional speech] thus slides ‘along a continuum’ from ‘public 
dialogue’ on one end to ‘regulation of professional conduct’ on the 
other.”162 The Stuart Court found that the ultrasound requirement fell in 
the middle of this continuum because it required physicians to both “say” 
and “do.”163 Notably, the court emphasized that the truthful and non-
misleading test applied by the Eighth and Fifth Circuits did not come from 
Casey’s First Amendment analysis.164 The Stuart Court noted that, in light 
of Casey’s scope, “The fact that a regulation does not impose an undue 
burden on a woman under the due process clause does not answer the 
question of whether it imposes an impermissible burden on the physician 
under the First Amendment.”165 The court therefore applied a “heightened 
intermediate scrutiny standard used in certain commercial speech cases,” 
which requires that the “statute directly advances a substantial 
governmental interest and that the measure is drawn to achieve that 
 
155. A pregnant woman may choose not to “receive the verbal explanation of the results of the 
sonogram images” only if the pregnancy was a result of sexual assault or incest, the woman is a minor 
who has received a judicial bypass, or the fetus has an “irreversible medical condition or abnormality.” 
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0122(d) (West 2020). 
156. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 576–78. 
157. Id. at 578. 
158. 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014). 
159. Id. at 242. 
160. Id. at 243.  
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 248 (emphasis in original).  
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 248–49. 
165. Id. 
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interest”—a test that North Carolina ultimately failed.166 
2. The Supreme Court Speaks in NIFLA 
The Supreme Court directly addressed professional speech in 2018 in 
NIFLA v. Becerra. At issue in NIFLA was the California Reproductive 
Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act 
(FACT Act),167 which was aimed at regulating Crisis Pregnancy 
Centers.168 These centers are mostly “pro-life (largely Christian belief-
based) organizations that offer a limited range of free pregnancy options, 
counseling, and other services to individuals that visit a center.”169 The 
California law required licensed pregnancy-related clinics to disseminate 
a notice to any customers stating the availability of publicly funded-family 
planning services, including contraception and abortion.170 The law also 
required unlicensed pregnancy-related clinics to disseminate a notice 
stating that they were an unlicensed clinic.171 Several Crisis Pregnancy 
Centers challenged both parts of the FACT Act as an abridgment of their 
First Amendment rights against government compelled speech.172 
Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had applied a broad 
professional speech doctrine that provided for an intermediate-like 
scrutiny akin to commercial speech, the Supreme Court refused to follow 
suit.173 The Court noted it has been “reluctant to mark off new categories 
of speech for diminished constitutional protection” absent persuasive 
evidence of a long, albeit unrecognized, tradition of diminished 
protection.174 However, the Court made clear in its decision that it was not 
entirely closing the door on creating a category of professional speech; 
rather, the evidence in this particular case was not compelling enough to 
do so.175 
 
166. Id. at 248, 250. 
167. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 123470–123473 (West 2018). 
168. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. (NIFLA) v. Becerra, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368 
(2018). 
169. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting CASEY WATTERS, MEG KEANEY & NATALIE 
EVANS, U.C. HASTINGS COLL. OF THE L., PUB. L. RSCH. INST., PREGNANCY RESOURCE CENTERS: 
ENSURING ACCESS AND ACCURACY OF INFORMATION 4 (2011)). 
170. Id. at 2369–70. 
171. Id. at 2370. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 2371–72. 
174. Id. at 2372. 
175. Id. at 2375 (“In sum, neither California nor the Ninth Circuit has identified a persuasive reason 
for treating professional speech as a unique category that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment 
principles. We do not foreclose the possibility that some such reason exists. We need not do so 
because the licensed notice cannot survive even intermediate scrutiny.”). 
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Despite the Court’s lack of recognition of a broad professional speech 
category,176 it listed two related categories with long histories of receiving 
lower scrutiny under the First Amendment: professionals’ commercial 
speech and the regulation of professional conduct.177 The first exception 
is for laws that require professionals to disclose “factual, noncontroversial 
information in their ‘commercial speech.’”178 The NIFLA Court went on 
to determine that this exception did not apply in the case because the 
California requirement was about advertising state-sponsored services, 
not the clinics’ own commercial services.179 
The second exception that the Court acknowledged was that a state may 
“regulate professional conduct, even though that conduct incidentally 
involves speech.”180 The Court did not define what constitutes 
“professional conduct,” but, notably, found that the California law did not 
fall under this exception because it “is not an informed-consent 
requirement or any other regulation of professional conduct.”181 The Court 
also cited to Casey, and the informed consent regulation at issue there, as 
a reference of a case that used the professional conduct exception 
properly.182 Together, this implies that informed consent laws fall under 
the “professional conduct” exception, and therefore may receive less than 
strict judicial scrutiny—however, what level of scrutiny is entirely 
uncertain.183 
Although the Court did not go into detail about the boundaries of these 
two exceptions, it did spend a significant amount of time emphasizing the 
importance of free speech and the unfettered right of physicians to speak 
as they please.184 The Court cited historical examples of governments 
 
176. Id. at 2372. 
177. Id. at 2372–73. 
178. Id. at 2372. This exception is rooted in cases like Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 
where the Court upheld a law requiring attorneys who advertised their services on a contingency fee 
basis to disclose that clients might have to pay some fees. The Court in Zauderer found that when a 
professional’s speech was “purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under 
which . . . services will be available,” then such speech should be upheld unless it is “unjustified or 
unduly burdensome.” Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). The NIFLA 
Court acknowledged that the Zauderer exception to professional speech in a commercial context was 
an exception to the strict scrutiny that is typically applied in cases involving regulated speech. NIFLA, 
138 S. Ct. at 2372. 
179. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 2373. 
182. Id. at 2372 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)). 
183. Id. 
184. See EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 452–53 (6th Cir. 2019) 
(Donald, J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom. EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Meier, __ U.S. 
__, 140 S. Ct. 655 (2019). 
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manipulating patient-doctor communication in the interest of suppressing 
minorities.185 This firm language, along with the refusal to create a new 
category of professional speech that receives lower scrutiny, highlights 
the Court’s conviction to protect the free speech rights of all. 
The Court went on to apply typical First Amendment strict scrutiny to 
the California law and ultimately found it to be an unconstitutional 
restraint of speech.186 The Court stated that, regardless of whether the 
State’s purported interest was substantial or not, the law failed because it 
was not narrowly tailored to that interest.187 
3. After NIFLA, Courts Still Are Struggling to Determine What 
Standard to Apply to Abortion Informed Consent Regulations 
The NIFLA decision left significant room for lower courts to interpret 
what abortion informed consent statutes could require and what standard 
of scrutiny should apply to these statutes. The Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals was the first to attempt to grapple with NIFLA’s new 
interpretation on professional speech in the abortion context, when it took 
up EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear.188 The case involved 
an ultrasound informed consent statute, similar to the one at issue in 
Lakey.189 Despite the new ruling in NIFLA, the EMW court ultimately 
decided the case based on a similar test as the Fifth and Eighth Circuits—
the law must be “truthful, non-misleading, and relevant.”190 The court 
notably went out of its way to mention that while the statute does not 
explicitly provide for an exception based on physician discretion, it also 
does not “penalize a doctor if she or he exercises discretion to advise a 
patient that she need not listen to or view the disclosures.”191 The EMW 
Court found that the relevant statute was similar in kind to the statute at 
issue in Casey, and therefore, survived.192 
However, echoing the Fourth Circuit in Stuart, the EMW dissent 
pointed to the fact that the “truthful, non-misleading, and relevant” test 
comes from precedent interpreting the Due Process Clause of the 
 
185. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2374. 
186. Id. at 2375–78. 
187. Id. 
188.  920 F.3d 421, 431 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. 
v. Meier, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 655 (2019). 
189. Id. at 424–25. 
190. Id. at 429. 
191. Id. at 424. 
192. Id. at 429–32. 
Luke (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2020  9:38 PM 
2020] SONOGRAMS AND SPEECH 2051 
 
Fourteenth Amendment, not the First Amendment.193 Casey only had one 
cursory paragraph on the First Amendment issue that merely upheld the 
Pennsylvania statute at issue.194 The dissent called into question whether 
the statute was truly similar to the Casey statute, especially when the 
statute at issue did not permit a physician to exercise discretion in the way 
that the Casey statute did.195 Additionally, the dissent echoed the NIFLA 
Court’s articulation that speech is a highly protected value in our 
society.196 The dissent urged the court to uphold the steadfast free speech 
rights that the Supreme Court so vehemently prescribes to by protecting 
physician’s right to not speak.197 
EMW demonstrates that NIFLA, despite directly grappling with the 
professional speech doctrine, has far from solved this problem. Instead, 
there is still ongoing debate about what form of scrutiny applies to 
mandatory ultrasound laws and when a state has gone too far in mandating 
“informed consent” and has instead trampled on firmly held First 
Amendment rights. 
III. FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES PREVENT THE 
GOVERNMENT FROM HAVING ABSOLUTE CONTROL OF 
PHYSICIAN SPEECH—EVEN WHEN REGULATING 
INFORMED CONSENT 
Mandatory ultrasound laws that do not provide for the therapeutic 
privilege and patient waiver exceptions likely compel speech in violation 
of the First Amendment, regardless of the form of intermediate scrutiny 
that is applied to professional conduct. Without these exceptions, 
mandatory ultrasound laws substantially infringe on longstanding 
principles of informed consent by removing physician discretion and 
instead compelling speech without regard for individual circumstances. 
Absent the therapeutic privilege and patient waiver exceptions, mandatory 
ultrasound laws are not substantially related to an important state interest, 
nor are they restricted to compelling only relevant information. 
Accordingly, mandatory ultrasound laws lacking these exceptions likely 
violate the First Amendment. 
NIFLA was a sweeping and firmly grounded opinion that emphasized 
the importance of the freedom of speech and the right of even physicians 
 
193. Id. at 448 (Donald, J., dissenting). 
194. Id. at 449; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992). 
195. EMW, 920 F.3d at 452 (Donald, J., dissenting). 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 453. 
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to speak as they please.198 The majority highlighted that “this Court’s 
precedents have long protected the First Amendment rights of 
professionals.”199 To emphasize this point, the Court specifically cited to 
historical examples of governments manipulating patient-doctor 
communication in the interest of suppressing minorities.200 The Court 
recalled the effort to increase the Romanian birth rate that resulted in a 
prohibition on giving patient’s information about birth control and 
condoms.201 The Court also commented on how “Chinese physicians were 
dispatched to the countryside to convince peasants to use 
contraception.”202 In fact, “[o]f the 5,945 words in the majority and 
concurring opinions [of the NIFLA decision], approximately 2,485 
(41.8%) of them were dedicated to explicating the dangers of abridging 
speech.”203 This shows that the Court and this country have deeply held 
free speech convictions that extend to physicians because of the fear of 
the despotic alternatives. 
The Casey Court also underscored the importance of physician 
discretion when it upheld the Pennsylvania statute’s informed consent 
provisions. The Casey Court highlighted the importance of the explicit 
exception in the statute that “does not prevent the physician from 
exercising his or her medical judgment.”204 The Supreme Court has a 
clearly established reverence for the professional judgment of physicians. 
In addition to the deference that the Court has for physician discretion, 
medical practice and informed consent principles highly emphasize the 
importance of permitting room to account for each patient’s particular 
circumstance.205 Because each patient walks into a doctor’s office with 
their own history and knowledge, a physician must naturally account for 
the nuances of each particular situation. For example, a physician may 
understand that with the patient’s age and health there are certain risks 
that are far lower than others and therefore those risks are not worth 
relaying to an already worried patient.206 Or a physician might know that 
a patient who has no higher education and does not work in the medical 
 
198. Id. at 452–53. 





203. EMW, 920 F.3d at 452 (Donald, J., dissenting).  
204. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883–84 (1992). 
205. ACOG, supra note 20, at 5; Informed Consent, supra note 96. 
206. Grimm, supra note 22, at 44; Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 251–52 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing 
ACOG, supra note 20, at 3, 5).  
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field will need a more simplified explanation than if that physician is 
treating a patient with medical knowledge.207 
Along with a physician’s duty to understand the whole context of a 
patient’s circumstances, informed consent principles emphasize a 
patient’s ability to determine care for themself. A patient may reasonably 
waive receiving information that is part of a “typical” informed consent 
discussion.208 For example, if the patient is seeking an abortion as result 
of a rape, they may reasonably wish to forego a medically unnecessary 
ultrasound to avoid the trauma that might ensue.209 Or if the patient is 
getting an abortion because a wanted pregnancy resulted in a non-viable 
fetus, given the context and the emotional weight of the decision, an 
ultrasound would not help the patient in making an informed decision.210 
The importance of physician discretion and accounting for subjective 
patient experiences is foundational in First Amendment precedent and 
established medical practice. While the precise language of the 
intermediate scrutiny test for informed consent provisions is not known, 
in any form there must be a reasonable “fit” between the interest espoused 
and the means used.211 Under the two most common standards that lower 
courts use for a regulation of informed consent, the regulation must be 
“substantially related” or “relevant”—blanket compulsions of speech 
have been historically struck down.212 Mandatory ultrasound laws without 
the therapeutic privilege and patient waiver exceptions would fail either 
form of scrutiny because they do not have an adequate fit with the stated 
government interest. 
By creating a broad statute with no ability for discretion by the patient 
or physician, state governments create a widely overinclusive regulation 
that mandates speech that is entirely irrelevant to the government’s 
interests. For example, if a patient receives an ultrasound earlier the same 
day as an abortion there is no room for the patient or physician to waive 
receiving another ultrasound—despite the lack of new information it 
would bring. This compelled speech does nothing to further the state’s 
interest of properly informing consent. Another example is if the patient 
is having an abortion because the child has a birth defect that will cause 
the child to die in birth. The inability to discretionarily waive the 
 
207. Id. at 44 (“Caregivers can find themselves on a slippery slope-having to retreat backwards in 
the sophistication of the information presented while looking for a common ground of information 
that the patient can understand.”). 
208. ACOG, supra note 20, at 7; Informed Consent, supra note 96. 
209. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 254. 
210. Id. 
211. Supra section I.A. 
212. Supra section I.A. 
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ultrasound—forcing the physician to speak—does nothing to inform the 
patient or protect a fetus that is already nonviable. These statutes sweep 
broadly to include circumstances that do nothing but traumatize a patient 
and force a physician to literally speak when they otherwise would not. 
Including these exceptions allows the physician to tailor the speech to the 
particular situation and discretionarily waive the mandated ultrasound 
when it would be entirely irrelevant to the state’s proffered interest. These 
exceptions are easy avenues to ensure that the compelled speech has a 
basic fit to the interests of the state. 
Strict scrutiny typically requires the “least restrictive means” to be 
used.213 While intermediate scrutiny does not require this exacting burden, 
intermediate scrutiny still requires the legislature to consider alternative 
means of regulation that do not compel speech.214 The therapeutic 
privilege and patient waiver exceptions are readily available tools used 
frequently in medical practice. They may easily be included in statutory 
schemes and have huge implications for tailoring the informed consent to 
the specific situation of each patient. Having the built-in discretion to omit 
certain information that is entirely irrelevant to a patient’s decision-
making only helps to further define the statute to the specific desires of 
the legislature. The court in EMW conceded that individualized 
information is more relevant.215 Having these safety valves of discretion 
retains the subjective patient experience to receive information that 
actually is relevant instead of having a blanket government-mandated 
disclosure that cannot be tailored to individual circumstances. 
States are using mandatory ultrasound laws to compel physicians to 
literally speak when they otherwise would not—going beyond expressive 
conduct to implicate speech itself.216 However, the Court has repeatedly 
emphasized its distaste for the blanket compulsion of speech. In NIFLA, 
the exception for professional conduct was specifically written with the 
caveat that the conduct may only “incidentally burden speech.”217 This 
language emphasizes that courts and lawmakers should not take an 
absolutist approach to informed consent law. Informed consent in all 
contexts must give due weight to a physician’s ability to properly 
 
213. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
214. Id. 
215. EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 431 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. 
denied sub nom. EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Meier, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 655 (2019). 
216. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 255 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The coercive effects of the speech are 
magnified when the physician is compelled to deliver the state’s preferred message in his or her own 
voice. This Requirement treads far more heavily on the physicians’ free speech rights than the state 
pamphlet provisions at issue in Casey.”). 
217. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. (NIFLA) v. Becerra, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 
(2018). 
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determine the amount and type of information that is required for a 
patient’s full knowledge. While the state can impose its own view of how 
much or what type of information must be stated in a certain context, this 
regulation cannot be absolute. Nothing is “incidental” about mandating a 
physician, on threat of losing their license and possible legal penalties, to 
require the physician in every case to speak. 218 
CONCLUSION 
Abortion is a heavily litigated subject and states have grown 
increasingly bold in passing some of the most restrictive abortion laws in 
history.219 In particular, litigants have been attacking mandatory 
ultrasound laws by claiming that they unconstitutionally compel protected 
speech of the physician.220 These cases attempt to balance the long upheld 
right of the state to regulate a physician through licensing221 and the 
physician’s First Amendment rights.222 The Supreme Court’s decision in 
NIFLA implied that abortion informed consent statutes receive some kind 
of intermediate scrutiny—but the Court failed to articulate exactly what 
that scrutiny entails.223 Underlying this conflict is established principles 
of informed consent and free speech protections.224 While the limits of 
informed consent may be uncertain, the Supreme Court has been firm in 
its conviction to protect speech from blanket government compulsion.225 
In order to survive any form of intermediate scrutiny, these ultrasound 
regulations must include exceptions for therapeutic privilege and patient 
waiver. These exceptions are necessary for the regulation to be 
substantially related to the state’s interest in providing the proper 
informed consent of a patient. They balance the goals of mandating 
informed consent and safeguarding a physician’s First Amendment 




219. Manian, supra note 18, at 239; see sources cited supra note 17; sources cited supra note 8. 
220. EMW, 920 F.3d at 425. 
221. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889). 
222. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2374–76. 
223. See id. at 2373. 
224. ACOG, supra note 20, at 2–4; Informed Consent, supra note 96; U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
225. EMW, 920 F.3d at 452 (Donald, J., dissenting). 
Luke (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2020  9:38 PM 
2056 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:2027 
 
 
